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CIVIL LAW-SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-PARENT AND 
CHILD LIABILITY: Is A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT VIOLATED? -Spence 
v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258,439 N.E.2d 741 (1982). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the cornerstones of American law is that an individual 
should not be legally burdened for the wrongs of another on the 
mere basis of one's relationship or association with the person who 
committed a wrong. l This concept of individual liability has mani­
fested itself in both civil and criminal law, with the latter giving rise 
to the notion that one is innocent until proven guilty.2 
The civil and criminal arenas have dealt with this theory of in­
dividualliability in a range of cases. It has been held, for example, 
that there is a fundamental right to freedom of association with sub­
versive political groups;3 that one cannot be held liable for having a 
certain status, such as being a drug addict;4 and that legal burdens 
cannot be imposed on family members for the acts or status of an­
other family member, such as illegitimacy5 or a mother's violent acts 
against a third person.6 
The broad proposition that individuals have a substantive due 
process right not to be civilly punished for the acts of another has 
rarely been narrowed by courts, and courts have narrowed this prop­
osition only when public policy has strongly necessitated such ac­
tion.7 One area in which public policy considerations have come 
I. St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). ("Freedom from punishment in 
the absence ofpersonal guilt is a fundamental concept in the American scheme of jus­
tice." Id at 425 (emphasis in original). 
2. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 8 at 53 (1972). See 
also MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 342 at 805 (E. Cleary ed. 
1972). 
3. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
4. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
5. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). (Court invalidated 
a Louisiana statute which granted workmen's compensation benefits to legitimate chil­
dren for the death of a parent but deprived benefits to illegitimate children. 
6. St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). (Children cannot be expelled 
from school for their mother's act of hitting the school's vice-principal). 
7. Id at 425-26. 

In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment 

on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship 
of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity. . . ,that re1a­
511 
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into play is with parent and child liability. Early tort law declared 
that parents were not liable for the torts of their children merely be­
cause of their parenthood and were liable only if they ratified or 
consented to the child's act or if the act fell under a traditional tort 
liability category.8 Many states found this system unworkable how­
ever, since the financial situation of many minors often left plaintiffs 
uncompensated.9 Thus states have enacted statutes holding parents 
financially liable for certain types of property or physical injury.lO 
The question is whether strong public policy considerations 
were present in Spence v. Gormley, II wherein two women were le­
gally burdened, in the form of evictions, due to their maternal rela­
tionship with the young men who were accused of firebombing their 
neighbor's apartments. 12 
This note will establish that there is a substantive due process 
right not to be legally burdened for a wrong unless one is responsible 
for committing that wrong. It shall also be demonstrated that this 
right not to be burdened is a fundamental right. 13 The relationship 
between parental liability for the acts of their children and the right 
not to be burdened for the wrongs of another will be explored within 
the context of the facts presented in Spence v. Gormley. 14 
Specifically, this note will examine how the traditional law of 
torts, which generally holds parents blameless for their children's 
wrongs, has been statutorily narrowed in order to effectuate the goal 
that victims be adequately compensated. It will then be shown that 
the solution to protecting this fundamental right is to increase the 
burden of proof beyond a mere "preponderance of the evidence" to 
a standard of "clear and convincing evidence." Furthermore, this 
note contends that when a court is presented with the issue of the 
right not to be burdened, it ought to contemplate less restrictive al­
ternatives before imposing a harsh judicial remedy. 
Throughout, the note will indicate how an entirely different re­
sult might have emerged (1) had the supreme judicial court not as­
sumed facts that the trial court did not find; (2) had the cases not 
tionship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt 
Id (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961». 
8. 387 Mass. 258, 439 N.E.2d 741 (1982). 
9. Id at 259-60, 439 N.E.2d at 743. 
10. 67A C.l.S. Parent and Child § 123 (1978). 
II. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 871 (4th ed. 1971). 
12. See infra note 87. 
13. See infra notes 41-63 and accompanying text. 
14. 387 Mass. 258, 439 N.E.2d 741 (1982). 
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been consolidated;IS and (3) had the court properly categorized the 
right to freedom from liability without individual guilt as a funda­
mental or important right. This heightened status may only be in­
fringed upon after strict or intermediate scrutiny rather than a 
rational basis standard. 16 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In April, 1981 and May, 1981, the Boston Housing Authority 
(BHA) started summary process eviction proceedings against two 
families, the Gormleys and the Buntings, for alleged violent acts to 
BHA property and/or BHA employees by the two families' sons. 17 
. The Boston Housing Court, as trier of fact, allowed the eviction of 
each of the families. IS The Housing Court based its decisions on 
findings that on May 11, 1980, Mark McDonough, son of Mrs. 
Gormley, firebombed the BHA-owned apartment of a black family, 
and that on July 17, 1980, he assaulted a black BHA employee. 19 
The court similarly found that William Bunting participated in a ra­
cially motivated firebombing of a BHA apartment on November 7, 
1980.20 
The supreme judicial court granted a request for direct appel­
late review, and in so doing, consolidated the previously separate 
cases of the Gormleys and Buntings into one action.21 Mrs. Gor­
mley's son Mark was sixteen at the time of the alleged incident and 
living at home.22 When the supreme judicial court heard the case, 
Mark was serving the second year of a six-to-ten year sentence for 
crimes unrelated to the firebombings. 23 While Mrs. Gormley stated 
that she did not intend to let her son Mark return home after his 
release from prison, Mark stated that he did intend to return home.24 
William Bunting, Mrs. Bunting's son, was eighteen when the 
15. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 94-95. 
16. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 274, 439 N.E.2d at 751. See also St. Ann, 495 F.2d at 
427: "Having established a significant encroachment upon a basic element of due pro­
cess, the state, in order to justify this encroachment, must satisfy a substantial burden 
.... One must analyze the compelling reason ...." (emphasis in original). 
17. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 439 N.E.2d 741 (1982). 
18. Id. at 259, 439 N.E.2d at 743. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 260, 439 N.E.2d at 743. 
21. Id. at 258, 439 N.E.2d at 742. 
22. Id. at 259-60, 439 N.E.2d at 743. 
23. Id. at 260, 439 N.E.2d at 743. 
24. Id. 
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firebombing occurred,25 and was thus an adult. William had been in 
the custody of the Division of Youth Services (DYS) from the ages 
of eleven to eighteen, at which time he could only visit home once a 
month.26 At the time of the incident, however, William was no 
longer under the DYS program and visited home sporadically.27 
The fact that William no longer lived at home also distinguished him 
from Mark McDonough. 
III. ANALYSIS BY THE COURT 
A. Lease Provisions 
The supreme judicial court began its review of whether Mrs. 
Gormley and Mrs. Bunting could be evicted for the alleged acts of 
their sons by carefully examining the leases signed by the tenants.28 
Out of the ten permissible grounds for termination of tenancy 
by the BRA, there were three which the court found applicable to 
the present case.29 While the firebombings of BRA property and as­
sault of a BRA employee would have been sufficient reason to evict 
a tenant according to the lease provisions, the issue was whether the 
provisions for termination applied to household members who had 
not signed the lease and were not named as tenants. 
The court found that the provisions did apply to household 
members under the premise that the acts committed constituted a 
threat to "health and safety or a likelihood of interference with 
rights."30 The court believed that the wording of the lease suggested 
support for the eviction if the problem came from within the house­
25. Id 
26. Id 
27. Id 
28. Id at 261-63, 439 N.E.2d at 744-45. Mrs. Gormley and Mrs. Bunting had 
signed identical lease forms and were the sole persons signed as "tenant" on their respec­
tive leases. The lease form itself was a result of collective bargaining between the Boston 
Public Housing Tenants' Policy Council, Inc. and the BHA. Id at 261, 439 N.E.2d at 
744. 
29. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 261-62, 439 N.E.2d at 744. The court found the perti­
nent provisions to be: 
This lease may be terminated by the [BHA) ... for no reason other than 
. . . 2. Reasonable likelihood of serious repeated interference with the rights of 
other tenants ... 5. Creation or maintenance of a serious threat to the health or 
safety of other tenants ... 10. 'In the event of a violation by the Tenant of any 
of the terms, conditions or covenants of this lease. In addition, ... [the tenant 
agrees to) [l)ive in a peaceful way, respecting the rights of his neighbors to pri­
vacy and quiet. 
Id 
30. Id at 262, 439 N.E.2d at 744. 
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hold, regardless of whether the source of the problem was the actual 
tenant or merely a family member.3l The court also found such a 
result to be harmonious with the primary purpose of the termination 
provisions that existed to promote safety and order within BHA 
housing.32 
B. Statutory Requirement of Cause 
The court then considered the tenants' argument that in order 
for the BHA to terminate a lease in these factual situations, it must 
be shown that the mothers were personally responsible for their sons' 
conduct.33 In rejecting this argument, the court referred to the statu­
tory requirement of Massachusetts General Laws c. 121B § 32 which 
stipulates that a housing authority, such as the BHA, cannot "termi­
nate a tenancy without 'cause.' "34 The court concluded that, in ac­
cordance with the statutory provisions, "violent acts by household 
members can constitute 'cause' to terminate a tenancy."35 The court 
further stated that an amendment to § 32, added after these cases 
arose, which specifically included members of the tenant's household 
in considering causes for eviction, lent support for the proposition 
that the legislature approved of the inclusion of household mem­
bers.36 Prior to the amendment, the court found sufficient cause to 
terminate absent the tenant's ability to show that they could not fore­
see or prevent the violence.37 
The two exceptions to the cause requirement, which allow ter­
mination only when there is a connection between the tenant and the 
conduct underlying the discontinuance of the" tenancy, are as follows: 
I) when the circumstances indicate that the consequences of the evic­
tion will be severe; and 2) when there are "unsettled constitutional 
questions."38 
C. Constitutional Claims 
The unsettled constitutional questions exception led the court 
into a discussion of the tenants' constitutional claim, which is the 
focus of this article. Simply stated, the tenants' argued that there is a 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 263, 439 N.E.2d at 745. 
34. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1218, § 32 (West Supp. 1983-84). 
35. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 263-64, 439 N.E.2d at 745. 
36. Id. at 264 n.6, 439 N.E.2d at 745 n.6. For a counter argument see infra note 91. 
37. Id. at 265, 439 N.E.2d at 746. 
38. Id. at 264, 439 N.E.2d at 745. 
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due process right, beyond the reach ofMGL c.121B § 32, which re­
quires that a tenancy not be terminated without proof that the 
mothers were responsible for their sons' acts.39 The supreme judicial 
court found that this due process right was not applicable when the 
public health, safety or welfare was concemed.40 The court added 
that no higher standard of proof was necessary beyond the 'prepon­
derance of evidence' standard used41 for this lesser status right. 
IV. 	 ESTABLISHING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BE BURDENED 
ONLY UPON PERSONAL LIABILITY 
A. lJue Process Goes Beyond the Bill ofRights 
It was established in St. Ann. v. Palisi42 that "substantive due 
process rights are not limited to those liberties specifically enumer­
ated in the Bill of Rights."43 One of those rights not mentioned in the 
Constitution, but that nevertheless exists, is the right of an individual 
not to be legally burdened unless the individual is personally 
responsible. 
Since this right is not specifically mentioned in the Bill of 
Rights, it is necessary to find substantiation of the existence of the 
right from other sources. St. Ann unequivocally established the 
weight, or importance, of this right when the court declared that 
"[f]reedom from punishment in the absence ofpersonal guilt is a 
fundamental concept in the American scheme. In order to intrude 
upon this fundamental liberty governments must satisfy a substantial 
burden of justification."44 The court in Tyson v. New York City 
Housing Authority4s proclaimed the weight of this right by stating 
that "the concepts of personal guilt and individual responsibility 
... are touchstones of the Anglo-American system of law ... im­
plicit within the concept of due process is that liability may be im­
posed on an individual only as a result of that person's own acts or 
omissions."46 
39. Id at 270,439 N.E.2d at 748. 
40. Id at 273, 439 N.E.2d at 750. 
41. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). 
42. Id at 425. 
43. Id (citing Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the court 
held that wearing long hair in a public school is not subject to constitutional protection, 
and thus any such regulation need only meet minimum rationality tests). 
44. 369 F: Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
45. Id at 518. 
46. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
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B. The Perimeters of the Right 
In Scales v. United States ,47 the Supreme Court dealt with the 
issue of whether or not a person could be held liable for merely asso­
ciating with a criminal organization.48 The Court held that "[i]n our 
jurisprudence guilt is personal," implying that association, without 
more, is not a criminal wrong.49 
Freedom of association is not the only area afforded protection. 
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court struck down a statute 
which made it a crime to be a drug addict, reasoning that the status 
of a person does not involve criminal activity. so The Court found the 
California statute offensive in that it allowed a conviction simply 
based upon Robinson's" 'status' or 'chronic condition' ... [of] be­
ing 'addicted to the use of narcotics.' "S 1 
The substantive right of liability for individual guilt is not lim­
ited to the criminal arena. Oliver Wendell Holmes established this 
point succinctly when he said, "criminal liability, as well as civil, is 
founded on blameworthiness .... [A] law which punished conduct 
which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the com­
munity would be too severe for that community to bear."s2 
This substantive right surfaced again when the Supreme Court 
expressed its distaste for differentiating between legitimate and ille­
gitimate children. S3 The Court stated: "[I]mposing disabilities on the 
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concepts of our system that 
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsi­
bility or wrongdoing."s4 
47. Id 
48. Id at 224. The Court established that "[m)embership, without more, in an 
organization [said to be) engaged in illegal advocacy," was not criminal. Id at 225. The 
Court then stated that not all associational relationships were beyond liability. Conspir­
acy and complicity, the Court noted, were punishable offenses even without "the com­
mission of specific acts of criminality." Id 
49. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
50. Id The Court noted that the California statute, under which Robinson was 
arrested, did not require proof that narcotics were actually used in the jurisdiction, and 
that the jury had been instructed that they could convict Robinson even if they did not 
believe the evidence of his use of narcotics. Id at 665. 
51. Id 
52. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881). This idea was repeated by the 
court in Tyson, which stated: ''This notion of personal guilt is not limited to criminal 
actions." Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority, 369 F. Supp. 513,519 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974). 
53. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See supra 
note 5. 
54. Id 
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The right to associate with criminals was upheld in the civil case 
of Sawyer v. Sandstrom,55 which disallowed a loitering ordinance 
since it "punishe[d] an individual not for his own criminal acts, but 
rather for his act of being in a public place and associating with indi­
viduals whom he knows to be engaged in criminal activity, ie., drug 
use or possession."56 The Sawyer court further stated that it was in 
full agreement with the Supreme Court that "punishment must be 
predicated only upon personal guilt."57 
Lastly, this fundamental right appeared in a civil case, factually 
similar to Gormley.58 In Tyson v. New York City Housing Author­
ity,59 the court held it to be violative of the fourteenth amendment to 
evict tenants from their public housing for the criminal acts commit­
ted by their family members who were not living at home at the 
time.60 The court found the link of parental blameworthiness too 
weak: "There must be some causal nexus between the imposition of 
the sanction of eviction and the plaintiffs' own conduct. Defendants 
rely simply on the existence of the parent-child relationship."61 
In St. Ann v. Palisi,62 the connection between the weight and 
importance of the substantive due process right and the burden that 
the state must bear was made explicit by the court: 
[T]he children do not complain that they were denied the constitu­
tional right to an education, but that they were punished without 
being personally guilty. Thus a cardinal notion of liberty is in­
volved and substantive due process is applicable. 
Having established a significant encroachment upon a basic 
element of due process, the state, in order to justify this encroach­
ment, must satisfy a substantial burden.63 
55. 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980). 
56. fd. at 316. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), in which Justice 
Murphy stated that "[t]he deportation statute completely ignores the traditional Ameri­
can doctrine requiring personal guilt rather than guilt by association or imputation 
before a penalty or punishment is inflicted." fd. at 163 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
57. Sawyer, 615 F.2d at 316. 
58. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258,439 N.E.2d 741 (1982). 
59. 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
60. fd. at 521. 
61. fd. at 519. This case was brought as a class action but not allowed to continue 
as such. The plaintiffs in Tyson had been declared undesirable tenants and faced evic­
tion because of the conduct of their adult children. fd. 
62. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). 
63. fd. at 426-27 (emphasis in original). See infra notes 141-46 and accompany­
ing text for further discussion regarding substantial burden of proof. 
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C. Distinguishing and Extending the Fundamental Right Cases 
While Scales v. United States 64 reinforces the doctrine of per­
sonal guilt and its importance in determining liability, Scales may be 
distinguished from Gormley in two respects. First, Scales was a 
criminal case, which distinguishes it from Gormley in that there is 
concern regarding the severity of the offender's punishment. The 
loss of liberty in a criminal case is often more severe than a civil 
remedy, thus the standard of proof is higher in a criminal case.65 
Secondly Scales involved a pure freedom of association issue. While 
freedom to associate with a political or religious group and personal 
guilt for liability are two of the principle foundations underlying our 
system of jurisprudence, they are not identical. The two doctrines 
are entwined, however, in that one is allowed the freedom to associ­
ate with illegal groups because one cannot be burdened without per­
sonal guilt.66 
It is not clear, though, that the freedom to associate is protected 
on a personal level. That is, association with one's family, a personal 
affiliation, differs from association with a political or religious group 
in that a court is less willing to step inside the family unit and super­
vise the intra-family activities and relationships. On the other hand, 
courts have not hesitated to regulate other groups in society, such as 
religious or political organizations.67 The foregoing distinction was 
diminished, however, by the Tyson court: 
[P]laintiffs' allegation that their right of association has been in­
fringed does state a good cause of action. The nub of this claim is 
that by declaring these tenants ineligible for continued occupancy 
on the basis of their children's acts, the defendants have acted 
'solely from the fact of association' by the plaintiffs with their chil­
dren. . . . Such a claim, if proven, would run afoul of the First 
Amendment which guarantees . . . the right to freely associate 
with others, including members of his family, without interference 
from the state.68 
64. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
65. It is important to note that interference with the substantive due process right 
of individual guilt is repulsive to our judicial system, whether or not the interference 
stems from a civil or criminal matter. 
66. Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D. Neb. 1972). ("It makes no differ­
ence 'whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, eco­
nomic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of 
curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.' "). 
67. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960). 
68. Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority, 369 F. Supp. 5\3, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 
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In Fisher v. Snyder,69 the court recognized that most of the cases 
dealing with the constitutional right to freedom of association for 
teachers involved membership in organizations.70 Yet, it found no 
relevant distinction between that type of associational interest and 
that asserted by Mrs. Fisher: the right to associate with unrelated 
individuals.71 
Similarly, Robinson v. Californian differs from Gormley in that 
it involved criminal activity.73 Another distinction is that Robinson 
involved a status crime and warned against finding guilty those who 
carried a certain status, such as being a drug addict, without evi­
dence as to criminal activity.74 
Again, while the motivation behind the Supreme Court disal­
lowing status crimes may be due to a dislike for punishment without 
personal guilt, status crimes have not yet included the of status of 
motherhood. Rather, all the disallowed status crimes involve a sta­
tus that is tainted with illegality, such as being a drug addict or 
felon.75 The spirit of the law, however, is that there shall be no pun­
ishment without personal liability and certainly not for one's status 
in society. 
Although not entirely analogous, the case most similar to Gor­
mley in its facts and issues is Tyson,76 which involved a group of 
tenants who brought constitutional claims against the New York 
City Housing Authority.77 The plaintiffs' constitutional claim was 
whether the Housing Authority "may constitutionally eviCt an entire 
1974). This court cited Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), in which a 
teacher was dismissed from her position on grounds of immorality, i.e. on the basis of the 
guests she entertained at her home. fd. at 397. The court held that a teacher's right to 
freely associate was closely aligned to freedom of speech and that neither could be cur­
tailed without the strictest of scrutiny. fd. at 398-99. 
69. 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972). 
70. fd. at 399. 
71. fd. 
72. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
73. fd. at 660. 
74. fd. at 666-67. 
75. fd. See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), which involved a chal­
lenge to a Los Angeles ordinance making punishable the failure of a felon to register 
with the police within five days after entering the city. fd. at 226. The defendant chal­
lenged that statute on the ground that she was not aware that she had a duty to register. 
fd. at 227. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute stating that it put an unfair bur­
den on defendant to inquire as to a duty to register without notice of such duty. fd. at 
229. 
76. 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
77. fd. at 516. The tenants' constitutional claims consisted of procedural and sub­
stantive due process and equal protection issues under the first, fourth, ninth and four-. 
teenth amendments. fd. In addition, the tenants asserted their rights under the United 
521 1983] 	 PARENT-CHILD LIABILITY 
family from public housing on the sole ground that an adult child in 
that family, who does not reside in the parental home, has commit­
ted criminal acts which are deemed nondesirable."78 While Tyson is 
factually distinguishable in that all of the children were adults and 
did not live at home at the time the criminal acts were committed, it 
would be hasty and unwise to dismiss Tyson on this basis alone. The 
court in Tyson was entirely justified in focusing upon the lack of a 
causal nexus between the parent and the child's act and ignoring the 
aspect of whether or not the children lived at home. The Gormley 
court should have followed Tyson's example by concentrating on the 
relationship of the parent to the child's action. This would have ena­
bled the court to use the child's residence as an aspect of the familial 
relationship, ie., indicative of whether the parent knew or should 
have known of the child's propensity to cause damage and whether 
the parents controlled the child's acts. 
Lastly, St. Ann v. Polisi,19 like Tyson, is a civil case. The court 
in St. Ann refused to suspend the children from school for the violent 
act of their mother against a school official, stating that liability 
without personal guilt was an encroachment upon a basic substan­
tive due process right.80 The distinguishing feature, of course, is that 
in Gormley the relationships are reversed. 
V. THE ApPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS 	RIGHT OF PERSONAL BLAMEWORTHINESS TO 
PARENTAL LIABILITY 
The doctrine of individual "guilt" has been applied with vary­
ing results in cases where the issue is whether parents can be legally 
burdened for the tortious acts of their children. Examination of the 
common law of tort liability shows that the general rule is that the 
relationship of parent and child alone will not impose liability on the 
parent for the tort of the child.81 Specifically, "[t]he parent is not 
States Housing Act of 1937. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1401-1430 (1976). 369 F. Supp. at 521. The 
court dismissed plaintiffs' claim to a privacy interest. Id at 520. 
78. 369 F. Supp. at 518. 
79. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). 
80. Id at 425. 
81. See, e.g., Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 703 (E.D.N.C. 1954) 
(under North Carolina law a parent is not liable for the tort of a minor child by reason of 
the parent-child relationship even where a minor child, who could not be sued, negli­
gently operates the family car and strikes another driver); Anderson v. Butler, 284 N.C. 
723, 730, 202 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1974) (a parent may incur liability for injuries or damage 
when the parent entrusts to a minor child an instrumentality that becomes dangerous due 
to the youth's immaturity or lack of judgment); Shaw v. Roth, 54 Misc. 2d 418, 282 
522 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:511 
liable merely because the child lives at home with him, works for 
him, and is under his care, management and control."82 The reason­
ing behind the common-law principle of not holding the parent au­
tomatically liable was that there was no fusion of identity between 
parent and child as there was between husband and wife.83 
One exception to the general common law rule occurs when 
parents consent to the child's act or ratify it in some way.84 This 
liability is founded on standard negligence principles and is not con­
sidered to be an intrusion on substantive due process rights.85 Such 
liability typically arises in situations in which the parent entrusts a 
child with a dangerous instrumentality, such as a car, or entrusts the 
child with a weapon knowing the child to have dangerous tendencies 
under such circumstances. The parent is then liable under both the 
ordinary rules of negligence for the dangerous instrumentality, and 
under the family purpose doctrine for the car.86 
The general common law rule that parents are not liable left 
many plaintiffs uncompensated, since minors usually have no con­
trol over their finances or have no monetary resources at all. Thus, 
many states enacted legislation making parents statutorily liable for 
juvenile destruction.87 
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1967) (complaint against parents for an assault committed by their minor 
son failed to state a cause of action against parents, where parents had no knowledge of 
the child's vicious tendencies); see also 67A C.l.S. Parent and Child § 123, at 493 (1978). 
82. Annot., 155 A.L.R. 85, 86 (1945). 
83. See, e.g., Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 P. 374 (1927); PROSSER, 
supra note 46, at 871. See also Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modem and 
Common Law, ILL. L. REV. 163 (1921). 
84. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 871-72. 
85. Id. 
86. See Annot. 54 A.L.R.3d 974 (1973); PROSSER, supra note 10, at 871-72. The 
family purpose doctrine maintains that the owner of a car is liable for injuries brought on 
by the negligent operation of the car by a family member when the car is bought or kept 
for the pleasure of the family. Id. at 872. 
87. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 (1983); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5923-1 (Vernon 
1962); and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West Supp. 1983-84). The latter 
statute provides: 
Parents of an unemancipated child under the age of eighteen and over the 
age of seven shall be liable in a civil action for any willful act committed by 
said child which results in injury or death to another person or damage to the 
property of another, damage to cemetery property, or damage to any state, 
county or municipal property. This section shall not apply to a parent who, as a 
result of a decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, does not have custody 
of such a child at the time of the commission of the tort. Recovery under this 
section shall not exceed one thousand dollars for any such cause of action. 
Id. 
The Gormley court did not use this statute in its analysis because it deals squarely 
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The Restatement Second of Torts advocates a standard which 
requires parents to exercise reasonable care in controlling the child 
so that others including the child are not harmed or injured, if the 
parent: "(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to 
control [the] child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity 
and opportunity for exercising such control."88 
This test was used by the Gormley court when it analyzed the 
applicability of the Massachusetts statute. 89 Section 32 allows for 
evictions of tenants when there is just cause due to a serious threat to 
the health or safety of a tenant or employee of the housing author­
ity.90 The statute does not state that it applies to household members 
of the tenant.91 The supreme judicial court found that because the 
statute should be interpreted to include family members living at 
home, a burden is imposed upon the tenant to show that she could 
neither foresee nor prevent the violence of her son. If this was 
proven, then there [was] no 'cause' to evict" under the statute.92 The 
court further stated that the evidence in the case before it did "not 
negate the awareness of and ability to prevent violence."93 It is im­
portant to note, however, that the trial ''judge made no findings as to 
whether Mrs. Gormley knew or should have known of her son's pro­
pensity for violence, or whether she was able to control or prevent 
his actions."94 Since the supreme judicial court heard Gormley on. 
appellate review and not on a de novo basis, the court was not at 
liberty to make findings not made by the trial court.9S The court 
with compensation, not health and safety. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 439 
N.E.2d 741 (1982). 
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 at 123-24 (1965). 
89. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 265, 439 N.E.2d 741, 746 (1982). 
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 121B, § 32 (West Supp. 1983-84). 
91. The supreme judicial court noted that the amendment to section 32, enacted 
after the Gormley case arose, and which added the words "or a member of the tenant's 
household" should be read as an indication that the legislature meant for the unamended 
statute to also apply to household members. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 264 n.6, 439 N.E.2d 
at 745 n.6. Of course, the express addition of "household members" to the statute could 
as easily mean that the legislature did not intend for a person other than a tenant to be 
included until and unless the legislature decisively said so. 
92. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 265,439 N.E.2d 741, 746 (1982). 
93. Id 
94. Id at 260, 439 N.E.2d at 743. As for Mrs. Bunting, the trial judge found that 
while she knew or should have known of her son's violent tendencies, she had no ability 
to control his actions. Id at 266, 439 N.E.2d at 746. 
95. Id at 258, 439 N.E.2d at 741. (court granted a request for direct appellate 
review.) A denovo hearing would be one which tries the matter again as if no previous 
decision had been rendered and as if the case had not been heard before. Farmingdale 
Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 534,536 (D.N.I. 1971). See also 2 Am. 
Jur. 2d Admin. Law § 698 (1962). 
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erred in not remanding the case back to trial court for determination 
of whether Mrs. Gormley had such knowledge or control of her son's 
violence that would hold her liable. Furthermore, due to the possi­
bility that a trial court's findings as to Mrs. Gormley could differ 
from those as to Mrs. Bunting, the supreme judicial court should not 
have consolidated these two cases and should be wary of consolidat­
ing such cases in the future. 
The standard of "knowledge and control" was also used in­
DePasquale v. Delio Russo ,96 which came to a conclusion contrary to 
Gormley. The parents in DePasquale were not held liable despite 
the frequent use of fireworks by the child since there were only two 
incidents of misuse of fireworks, an amount insufficient to show a 
dangerous propensity on the part of the child.97 To adopt any other 
holding, the court summarized, "would go far toward exposing par­
ents to liability for the torts of their children solely because of their 
parenthood."98 The record in Gormley indicates that the mothers 
had some information of their sons' involvement in delinquent activ­
ities,99 yet DePasquale set the standard that, standing alone, "some" 
information of the child's tendencies was not enough to impose lia­
bility on the parents. lOO It is important that the court determine pre­
cisely the amount of information that parents have regarding the 
child's involvement in delinquent acts, because the legal question of 
parental liability through knowledge and control turns solely upon 
this factual determination. 101 
In Smith v. Jordan 102 the court chose not to rely upon the par­
ents' knowledge, but rather followed the more concrete path of the 
common law, that "[t]here must exist an authority from the father to 
the son to do the tortious act or a subsequent ratification and adop­
tion of it, before responsibility attaches to the parent."103 
In applying the Restatement Second test,I04 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Rautbord v. Ehmann, 105 
96. 349 Mass. 655, 212 N.E.2d 237 (1965). 
97. Id at 659, 212 N.E.2d at 239. 
98. Id at 659,212 N.E.2d at 240. 
99. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 260, 439 N.E.2d 741, 743 (1982). 
100. In Gormley, this factual determination should have been made at the trial 
level. See supra text accompanying notes 94 and 95. 
101. 211 Mass. 269, 97 N.E. 761 (1912). 
102. Id at 270-71, 97 N.E. at 761. 
103. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
104. 190 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951). 
105. Id at 537. (quoting The 84-H, 296 F. 427 (2d Cir. 1923), cerl. denied, 264 U.S. 
596 (1924). 
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further defined and narrowed the type of knowledge necessary for a 
parent to have in order to be liable for the child's tort. "'The privity 
or knowledge must be actual and not merely constructive. It in­
volves a personal participation of the owner in some fault or act of 
negligence. . . . There must be some fault or negligence on his part 
or in which he in some way participates.' "106 The mothers in Gor­
mley did not have such active knowledge. 
In Caldwell v. Zaher, 107 the court found that there was a duty to 
control a minor child if they knew of the child's propensity to assault 
and molest other children and yet did nothing to stop it. 108 But the 
court did allow for a trial regarding the parents' ability to control 
their son, or more precisely, "whether the defendants could halt 
[their son's] alleged propensity to assault other children and what 
steps to this end would be reasonable in the circumstances."I09 Simi­
larly, in Gormley it would have been wise if a trial had been held on 
whether Mrs. Gormley and Mrs. Bunting had control of their sons. 
While this is not an exhaustive study of the parent-child liability 
issue, it is adequate to show that the common law does not impose 
liability upon the parent for the acts of the child unless permitted by 
general rules of negligence, or other tort law. Many states, on the 
other hand, have enacted statutes for pecuniary reasons. I 10 Case law 
is divided between these two camps in finding liability for parents. 
Some courts refuse to hold a parent liable for their delinquent chil­
dren, III finding it too close to being burdened for doing no wrong; 
other courts are more likely to find liability so that injured parties 
may receive compensation. 112 
We have then an acknowledged important substantive due pro­
106. 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962). 
107. Id at 592, 183 N.E.2d at 707. 
108. Id 
109. Id at 593, 183 N.E.2d at 707. 
110. See supra note 87. 
III. See e.g., Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971), where the 
court held that recovery can only be had from a parent if the parent, under the terms of 
the state statute, negligently contributes to the tort. Id at 748, 182 S.E.2d at 769. See 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-113 (1966). The issue in Gormley was not that the mothers were 
forced to compensate the victims for their property damage, but rather that the mothers 
were being forced to leave their homes which compensated no one. 
112. See supra note 87. The court in Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Supp. 7, 373 
A.2d 191 (1977) cited Section 52-572 of the General Statutes of Connecticut and stated 
that the policy reasons behind the statute were two-fold: first, to deter juvenile delin­
quency, and second, to compensate innocent victims. Id at 10, 373 A.2d at 193. The 
court in Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W. 2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) stated that it was better 
to let parents pay than to let innocent victims bear a loss. Id at 438. 
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cess right not to be impinged upon for another's act. This right is 
subject to intrusion when the necessity is great. Acknowledging that 
the BHA's goal for safety and security is important, there is a way to 
pay credence to their goal and yet not infringe upon the fundamental 
right: by increasing the standard of proof. 
VI. BURDEN OF PROOF 
The customary manner of protecting an important right is to 
increase the standard of proof.ll3 This is exemplified in St. Ann v. 
Palisi,1l4 where the court insisted that "[h]aving established a signifi­
cant encroachment upon a basic element of due process, the state, in 
order to justify this encroachment, must satisfy a substantial bur­
den."lls The above standard should apply where, as here, there is a 
weighty due process right which is substantial enough to raise the 
burden of proof from beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence 
to a standard of clear and convincing. This higher standard of proof 
is necessary to ascertain, first, if the sons were involved in the 
firebombings; second, if the mothers knew or should have known of 
the sons' tendencies to commit such acts; and third, whether the 
mothers were in a position to exert control over their sons. 
This increase in proof would not hinder the BHA's desire for 
safe housing because the higher standard of proof would more accu­
rately determined if the family members were actually involved in 
the illegal activity complained of and whether they would have a 
tendency to engage in such acts in the future. A lower standard of 
proof is overly inclusive in that it allows the BHA to evict families 
without ensuring that the families are the source of the threat to the 
safety and security of BHA housing. 
The supreme judicial court refused to raise the burden of proof 
in Gormley.116 The judicial reasoning to reach that conclusion was 
both "roundabout" and erroneous. First, the court acknowledged 
the defendants' argument that they had a constitutional right to be 
free from liability without fault. I 17 The court then stated this consti­
tutional right need be overcome only by the BHA's meeting a ra­
tional basis test. 118 The proper standard of proof was then 
1l3. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 615 (5th Cir. 1972). 
114. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978). 
115. Id. at 582. 
116. 387 Mass. at 273, 439 N.E.2d at 750. 
117. Id. at 267, 439 N.E.2d at 747. 
118. Id. at 270, 439 N.E.2d at 749. 
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analyzed l19 wherein the court acknowledged that a higher interest 
was more worthy of a higher standard of proof. 120 To begin its anal­
ysis, the court examined the interest affected,121 then switched gears 
by declaring that the affected interest of the tenants was their right to 
housing,122 and not their right to be free from liability without 
fault. 123 Had the court focused on the right to individual liability, an 
increase in the burden of proof would have been necessary. Addi­
tionally, a higher standard of proof does not depend on the civil or 
criminal nature of a case,124 "but rather on the basis of the compet­
ing interests at stake and the risk which society is willing to assume 
for an erroneous decision ...."125 Society is not willing to assume 
the price of an erroneous decision when a fundamental right is in­
volved. As expressed in Karr v. Schmidt, 126 "[t]he due process clause 
does, of course, protect freedoms 'great and small' from wholly arbi­
trary state action. But it is only when 'fundamental' liberties are at 
stake that we place upon the state a 'substantial burden of justifica­
tion' for the infringement of liberty."127 Similarly, the court in St. 
Ann 128 stated that where there was a significant encroachment upon 
a basic element of due process, the state must satisfy a substantial 
burden in order to justify the encroachment. 129 
There have been several cases in Massachusetts in which the 
standard of proof was raised beyond a preponderance of the evi­
dence for something other than a fundamental right. 130 These cases 
119. Id. at 273, 439 N.E.2d at 751. 
120. Id. at 274, 439 N.E.2d at 751. 
121. Id. The court began this interest analysis by applying the three-prong Ma-
thews test. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
122. Id. at 275, 439 N.E.2d at 751. 
123. Id. at 275 n.16, 439 N.E.2d at 751 n.16. 
124. See infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text, for an analysis of the right 
not to be burdened under the Mathews three-prong test. 
125. French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (M.D.N.C. 1977). This case 
concerned an attack on North Carolina's involuntary commitment statute, as a violation 
of the 5th and 14th amendments' due process clauses. 
126. Id. 
127. 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972). 
128. Id. at 615 n.12. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text. See also, Sny­
der v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). where the Court stated: '1'he Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own 
conception of policy and fairness unless so doing it offends some principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 
Id. at 105. The right not to be burdened is deeply rooted in our judicial system and its 
elimination or diminishment would be offensive to our society. See supra notes 1-16 and 
accompanying text. 
129. St. Ann v. Palisi. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). 
130. Id. at 427. 
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signify that the supreme judicial court has recognized that there are 
areas of law that are sufficiently important, though not fundamental, 
to warrant an increase in the standard of proof. If the court finds it 
necessary to increase the proof required to determine a testator's po­
tency, \31 then surely the court should find an increase necessary 
when the issue is a cornerstone of our judicial system, ie., that an 
individual is not liable for the acts of another. The supreme judicial 
court, when faced with imposing the liability upon one person for 
the actions of another, in this case a mother for her son's, should 
increase the burden of proof from a mere preponderance of the evi­
dence to a standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
The United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Elridge 132 es­
tablished a test which would enable a judge to more accurately de­
cide when the standard of proof should be raised: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. l33 
The Gormley l34 court applied the Mathews test,135 but errone­
ously concluded that the right to a tenancy was the underlying inter­
est. The court should have found that the fundamental right to 
individual liability was the underlying interest. The application of 
the Matthews test to Gormley, utilizing as the basic interest the ac­
countability of the mothers for their sons' acts, would be as 
follows: 136 
1) 	 The private interest affected, that one be blame­
worthy before being blamed, is a fundamental 
131. See Foley v. Coan, 272 Mass. 207, 209-10,172 N.E. 74, 75 (1930) ("The proof 
must be convincing though it need not reach the certainty required in criminal proceed­
ings."); Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 517, 138 N.E. 6, 7 (1922) (required proof "be­
yond all reasonable doubt" to determine testator's impotence; Swartz v. Sher, 344 Mass. 
636, 639, 184 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1962) (used "beyond all reasonable doubt" in a contract 
action to recover a deposit for sale of land); Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 
107 Mass. 290, 317 (1871) (required "full, clear and decisive [evidence] free from doubt 
or uncertainty," in reforming an instrument on the grounds of mistake). 
132. 	 Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 517, 138 N.E. 6, 7 (1922). 
133. 	 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
134. 	 Id at 335. 
135. 	 Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258,439 N.E.2d 741 (1982). 
136. 	 Id at 274-77, 439 N.E.2d at 751-52. 
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right. This cherished right is one of the corner­
stones of our judicial system_ 137 
2) The risk of an erroneous decision is severe in two 
ways: 
a) It would lend a crushing blow to this impor­
tant right to allow a court to deprive a person 
without a sufficiently high standard of proof, 
and 
b) the practical effect of an erroneous decision in 
this area would be to evict a mother and her 
family from low-cost public housing with rea­
sonable housing substitutes few and far 
between. 138 
3) The probable value of this substitute standard of 
proof is extremely high since increasing the bur­
den accomplishes the objective of protecting per­
sons from unearned liability and yet does not 
completely eliminate the chances of the BHA 
achieving their desired end, since a parent with 
knowledge of a violent tendency and control over 
the child may still be liable and thus evicted. It is 
appropriate that a heavy burden of proof be 
placed upon the party attempting to narrow the 
fundamental right involved. 
4) The government's interest should be stronger in 
having fundamental rights protected rather than 
in having a mother be evicted because her son 
mayor may not have damaged BRA property and 
mayor may not return to do the same if the 
mother remains. Further, the substitute proce­
dure of an increase in the standard of proof is not 
a burden to the system since it requires that there 
be a closer connection between the liability im­
posed and the responsibility for the illegal actions. 
This is not a substantial burden to a system that is 
erected to mete out justice. 139 
137. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 260, 439 N.E.2d at 743. 
138. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text. 
139. See e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (1970) ("Yet, on the 
whole, the disadvantages the government will suffer from being required to allege good 
cause for eviction are not to be compared with the disadvantages that a tenant will suffer 
if he is evicted capriciously."); Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 
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VII. LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE 
In conjunction with increasing the standard of proof, an effort 
must be made to investigate whether the 'punishment' chosen is the 
least restrictive alternative. In Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 140 the circuit 
court quoted the United States Supreme Court when it stated that 
fundamental personal liberties could not be stifled by legitimate gov­
ernmental purposes if the result sought can be more narrowly 
achieved. 141 
One example of a less restrictive alternative would be that the 
BHA could have the mother agree to 'evict' the son, and employ the 
aid of an outside agency to help in enforcement. After all, the court 
indicated that it would have been willing to allow this type of action 
when an adult household member was likely to be violent and could 
not be controlled by the tenant. 142 The court concluded that having 
taken such preventive measures, the tenant had done all that was 
possible and thus should not be held responsible for any subsequent 
violence by the household member. 143 
There is also support for the argument that it is more appropri­
ate to evict only the non-desirable household member with the con­
sent of the family, or to have the family find a way to remove the 
troublemaking member. This approach is especially applicable 
when, as in the Bunting case, the targeted member is an adult who is 
away from home more often than not and who is uncontrollable or 
unwanted. This allows the family the option of either keeping the 
family intact and moving out or keeping the apartment. l44 While 
this alternative would be sufficient for an adult household member, 
the BHA would have a legitimate hesitancy to require the same in 
the case of a minor child. This being so, it may not be wise for a 
court to continue to consolidate cases where one household member 
861 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1971) ("Nor is it conclusive in the consider­
ation of appellants' constitutional claims to argue that there is no constitutional right to 
continue living in public housing projects."). 
140. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) as an exam­
ple of a burden to the system wherein beneficiaries of a trust had to be notified before 
action could be taken, creating both a time delay and financial expense. 
141. 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980). 
142. Id. at 317, citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), wherein the 
Court stated: "The breadth oflegislative abridgement must be viewed in the light ofless 
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 
U.S. II (1966). (statute requiring teachers to take a loyalty oath invalidated; Court stated 
that though the ends were legitimate, a fundamental liberty was at stake, i.e. freedom to 
associate). . 
143. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 266, 439 N.E.2d at 746. 
144. Id. 
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is a minor and the other an adult, since such diverse factual situa­
tions may result in entirely different decision,s if decided separately. 
Other alternatives would be for the BRA to press criminal 
charges against the offender, wherein the BRA would be required to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the household member com­
mitted the crime as charged. This course of action would be expedi­
tious in removing the offender from the premises if a jail sentence 
was imposed and yet would not uproot the family. On the other 
hand, if compensation is the ultimate aim, the BRA could bring a 
tort action against the mother for money damages. 145 This action 
would likely be insufficient, however, against a low-income tenant 
who might be judgment proof. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
There is a substantive due process right not to be blamed for the 
act of another or for one's association with others who commit illegal 
acts. This right is one of the strongholds of our judicial system and 
has attained the status of a fundamental right. 
This right, as with most rights, fundamental or not, is not com­
pletely free from intrusion. When the governmental interest is suffi­
ciently high, an inroad is permissible. Parental liability for wrongful 
acts committed by their children is an inroad on the requirement 
that there be individual blameworthiness before a burden is im­
posed. Traditional tort law does not allow such an infringement un­
less the parent may be held liable under an existing theory of tort 
liability. Certain statutes, however, have allowed for such liability to 
effectuate such goals as the compensation of injured plaintiffs,146 the 
promotion of health and safety,147 and when the parent is knowl­
edgeable of the child's propensity for danger and is able to control 
the child. 
In the case at hand, the supreme judicial court erred in dis­
missing the tenants' constitutional claim to the fundamental right to 
be personally blameworthy. The right is not applicable only in crim­
inal cases, nor can it be summarily dismissed on the basis that the 
145. See Note, Policy Just(jications for Public Housing Evictions,S COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REv. 215 (Spring 1973). This note analyzes the policy justifications used by New 
York City public housing agencies in evicting whole families for the act of one family 
member. Additionally, it explores the social ramifications of saving an apartment versus 
saving a family. 
146. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West Supp. 1983-84). 
147. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West Supp. 1983-84). 
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government has a strong concern for the health, safety and welfare 
of housing authority tenants and employees since evicting the blame­
less will not insure safety for the government's tenants and 
employees. 
The government can protect its goal of safe housing and yet not 
interfere with the fundamental right by merely increasing the gov­
ernment's burden of proof from 'preponderance of the evidence' to a 
standard of 'clear and convincing evidence'. This would allow the 
courts more accuracy in finding the culprit liable and deciding 
whether the mothers were aware of the sons' tendencies, and 
whether they could control their sons. In addition, the state should 
be made to offer less restrictive alternatives, so that, as here, an entire 
family would not be uprooted were a more reasonable and temper­
ate solution available. 
While the state certainly has a legitimate interest in safe, public 
housing, this goal was not furthered by the Gormley decision in a 
constitutionally sound manner. The court dismissed the due process 
right to not be burdened by another's wrong in an attempt to accom­
modate the goal of the BHA. The goal of the supreme judicial court 
should be to protect this substantive due process right by raising the 
burden of proof from a mere preponderance of the evidence stan­
dard to a standard of clear and convincing evidence and addition­
ally, the court should search for less restrictive alternatives. These 
protections of the due process right would not interfere with the 
BHA's goal of safe housing since the BHA will be sure that the evic­
tion is clearly and convincingly the result of the household members' 
action, rather than a fifty-one percent belief. Evicting innocent ten­
ants will not bring about more safe housing, only more homeless 
people. 
Due to the dissimilarity in findings of knowledge and control of 
the mothers for their sons, and because of the difference of ages of 
the sons, one a minor, the other an adult, the court should not have 
combined the Gormley and Bunting cases. The results can differ 
markedly in terms of responsibility and choice of less restrictive al­
ternatives. The Gormley decision leaves practitioners and lower 
courts at a loss when handling cases of this type since the court set no 
clear standard as to how to treat the differences between 1) a minor 
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child and an adult child, 2) an emancipated child versus unemanci­
pated, 3) a child who is frequently at home as opposed to one who is 
habitually away.148 
Ina A. Forman 
148. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 121B, § 32 (West Supp. 1983-84). 
